Theoretical psychology is a fascinating field that delves into the philosophical and theoretical aspects of psychology. Let’s explore its significance:
- Interdisciplinary Exploration: Theoretical psychology bridges the gap between philosophy and psychology. It draws from the philosophy of science, emphasizing logic, rationality, and conceptual depth.
- Historical Roots: Theoretical psychology predates empirical psychology. Pioneers like Wilhelm Wundt, William James, William Stern, and John B. Watson laid its foundation. Today, notable contributors continue to shape this field, including Klaus Oberauer, Klaus Fiedler, Robert Sternberg, and Brent Slife.
- Epistemological Grounding: Theoretical psychology doesn’t aim to declare one theory as more “truthful” than another. Instead, it provides a scientifically grounded exploration of ideas based on epistemology. Its rich historical context allows for a deeper understanding of psychological concepts and theories.
In summary, theoretical psychology enriches our understanding of human behavior, thought, and development by exploring the underlying theories that shape our understanding of the human experience.
The AG P&P’s International Academy for Theoretical Psychology and Psychological Philosophy aims at providing an engaging and interactive format for talented students from any background.
At its core, the academy consists of biweekly online classes which are dedicated to open discussion. Every other Monday, we will meet at 6 pm Vienna time (5 pm UTC) in a ZOOM videocall to engage with problems from philosophy and psychology.
Philosophers and psychologists from different backgrounds will begin each class with a short introduction and afterwards organise the discussion. The program can be found below.
If you feel like attending the course and want to register – entirely voluntarly and free of charge – please contact academy@phi-psy.de. You will then receive further details in the future.
We are looking forward to your participation!
| Date | Problem | Text | Mentor |
|---|---|---|---|
| November 4th | Historical Perspectives on Manualization in Clinical Psychology | DSM and the Death of Phenomenology in America: An Example of Unintended Consequences (Nancy C. Andreasen, 2006) | Hannes Wendler |
| November 18th | Developmental Psychology and the Century of the Child | 1. Das Individiualitätsproblem (William Stern, 1911), 2. Die Idee einer Kulturpsychologie (Karl Bühler, 1927) | Philipp Seitzer |
| December 2nd | Historical Materialism and the collective psyche | 1. The Philosophy of Money (Simmel, 1900); Like leaves in the wind: does democracy have it´s own atmosphere? (Griffero, 2020); 3. The Phenomenology of Affectivity (Fuchs, 2013) | Johannes Hofmann |
| December 16th | Affordances in Ecological Psychology | The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Ch. 8, “The Theory of Affordances.” (James Gibson, 1986) | Daniel Dwyer |
| January 13th | The Unconscious as a Psychological Concept | A Note on the Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis (Sigmund Freud, 1912) | Thomas Dojan |
| January 27th | Concept, Content, Context, and Cognition | Content, Conceptual Content, and Nonconceptual Content (Adrian Cussins, 1990) | Jerry Huang |
| February 10th | Paradigm Shifts and Psychology | The Mythical Revolutions of American Psychology (Thomas H. Leahey, 1992) | Malte Schlenker |
| February 24th | Collective Intentionality | Collective intentionality vs. Intersubjective and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality (Vecchi, 2011) | Lukas Pieroth |
| March 10th | Psychological Explanation | Explanation and Cognition, Ch. 5, "How Does It Work?" versus "What Are the Laws?": Two Conceptions of Psychological Explanation (Robert Cummins, 2000) | Danaja Rutar |
| March 24th | Emotional Cognitivism | Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions (John Deigh, 1994) | Raphael Röchter |
Schedules of previous semesters:
| Date | Problem | Text | Mentor |
|---|---|---|---|
| March 4th | Scientism vs. Foundationalism | John Erpenbeck (1991): Philosophical Problems of Modern Psychology | Alexander Wendt |
| March 18th | Critique of Psychological Humanities | Thomas Teo (2017): From psychological science to the psychological humanities | Hannes Wendler |
| April 1st | Scientific modelling and representing | Tarja Knuuttila (2011): Modelling and representing: An artefactual approach to model-based representation | Daniel Niesyt |
| April 15th | The vagueness of psychological concepts | Fabian Hutmacher & David Franz (2024): Approaching psychology’s current crises by exploring the vagueness of psychological concepts | Fabian Hutmacher |
| April 29th | Transcendental foundation of psychology | Frederick Wertz (2016). Outline of the relationship among transcendental phenomenology, phenomenological psychology, and the sciences of persons. | Julian Meergans |
| May 13rd | Conceptual critique of the neurosciences | Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology as a critical instrument for the psychological sciences | Lucas Janz |
| May 27th | Paradigm Shifts and Psychology | The Role and Use of Conceptual Analysis in Psychology (Timothy Racine and Kathleen Slaney ed., Palgrave, 2013) | Malte Schlenker |
| June 10th | Choosing Simulation over Prediction and Explanation in Psychology | Tal Yarkoni & Jacob Westfall (2017): Choosing prediction over explanation in psychology: Lessons from machine learning | Stefan Radev |
| June 24th | Philosophy of Science and Test Vallidity Theory | Keith Markus & Denny Borsboom (2013): Frontiers of Test Validity Theory: Measurement, Causation, and Meaning (Section 1.2) | Josh Ramminger |
| July 8th | The theory crisis in psychology - problems, causes and solutions | Denny Borsboom et al. (2021): Theory construction methodology: A practical framework for building theories in psychology | Ruben Ellinghaus |
| July 22nd | Phenomenological Psychology | Amedeo Giorgi (1983): Concerning the Possibility of Phenomenological Psychological Research | Timo Munz |
| August 5th | The difference between signal and meaning as a criterion for the basis of consciousness in animals and humans | The difference between signal and meaning as a criterion for the basis of consciousness in animals and humans | Oliver Schulz |
| August 19th | Anomalous Monism and the (im)possibility of any scientific psychology | Donald Davidson (1995): Mental Events. | Lukas Nehlsen |
